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1.- INTRODUCTION 
The subject to be dealt with here - technology imports as against 
local production - is a question open to debate within the recent 
industrial experience of countries such as Spain, with a medium level 
of development. Placed in the general framework of this meeting, 
this subject takes form in the simultaneous discussion of two problems. 
In the fust place, Spanish policy on transfer (importation) of foreign 
technology has, in recent years, followed certain guidelines, the efEi-
cacy of which should be discussed in the light of experience in techno-
logy imports in the defense :irdJst::J:y sectCII:'. In the second place, and closely 
linked to the former, we wish to make an analysis of the efEects 
of those foreign technology imports on other than the defense industries, 
but which are closely connected with them. Obviously, in this dis-
cussion, the problem will constantly be raised as to what the bala11ce 
should be between the importation of technology and the creation of 
technology from our own resource. 
We _think that this discussion acquires parti.cuIar relevance in the 
Spanish case, for the following reasons: 
a) The recent majar industrial deve.lopment of this country, and our 
weakness in the generation o local technology ( 1 ) . 
b) Spain is no international military power so that it is not possible 
to automatically transfer the conclusions whieh may be obtained 
from studies of the !:lore advaneed countri...es. 
e) The technological insufficiencies of the national defense industry 
means that the main fl.ow of technology for this sector comes from 
overseas ( 2 ) . 
d) The marked State control of this sector whieh, amongst other thirlgs, 
reduces the presenee of foreign interests - in re1ation with the 
average situation in the manufacturing sector - and greater capacity 
for use of the State I s purchasing power to boost the industry and 
plan development. 
• . !.I •• 
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e) Spain's recent entry to the EEC and NATO, providing a new frame-
work for our military industry. 
For these reasons, we think it is of the greatest relevance to ask 
t...'1e follow:ing questions o What has been the pattero followed by the' 
Spanish defense industry in the importation and/or creation of techno-
logy? What nave been the effects on the sector itself and on the rest 
of the industry? What are the lessons to be taken for technology policy, 
in particular in connection with technology transfeI'? These are clearly 
very oomplex matters which can hardly be dealt with fully in a paper 
such as this one, especially when it is remembered that the:re are 
great difEiculties in securing information of a precise nature on this 
type of industry o Our more modest aim will be to organize the dis-
ct.1Ssion and previde the materials which, we think, are most important 
in reaching certain init:Lal oonclusions, which will of course be pro-
visional. The following are the specific steps to be taken. 
, 
. 
Background on Spanish technology transfer policy and on the Spanish 
defense industry. 
Basic aspects of technology development of our defense industry in 
the present situation, especially in the light of the ne,q defense pre-
grams. 
Conclusions, with special reference to repercussions in the industry 
and technology in the military field on the rest of the industrial sec-
tor. 
2.- BACKGROUND TO THE PRESENT SITUATION 
2.1 The Technological dependence of the Spanish Industry, emd Goveroment 
Policy on Technology Transfer 
A general point of reference for this paper is the historical lateness 
of Spanish industrialization and the heavy burden of technological 
dependence formed on nationalistic bases for the creation of an indus-
tr'..al structure, and strong protection against overseas co m petition ( 3 ) . 
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As this nationalistic stage gave way to an increasing external opening-
up of the Spanish economy, from the fifties onwards, a situation was 
to arise in which the technological weakness of our industrial structure 
was to be decisive in the large-scale admission of foreign technology, 
wether in incorporated forrn (direct investments, capital goods imports) .. 
or otherwise (licence!?, technical assistance, etc.). This led to a vicious 
':ircle in which the scant lecal technological prowess boosted the 
importation of technology; as this was not done with clear guidelines 
or assimilation and progressive replacernent, it had a negative effect 
on lecal efEorts. 
In this situation, the. concern of the Spanish authorities did not, 
in the best cases, go beyond a relatively correct diagnosis of the 
problems, particulary as, time and again, international reports coincided 
as to this se..-:ious weakness in the Spanish economy ( 4) . 
In practice, action intended to pro mote sci.ence and t,echnology at the 
local level were scant, and yielaed very poor results. 
At the same time, the awareness of the need to l.;llport technology 
from overseas has been present throughout recent industrial develop-
ment, to the point where the State played an important part in its 
acquisition, 
substitution 
principally in the final moments of industrialization in 
for imports (fifties and pan of the fO.rties). However, 
the process of incorporation of foreign technology took place in large 
part without the presence of a suitable polky as to sc1ection, adapta-
tion and assimilation of the imported product( s) and/or process Ces) (5,) . 
In the most clifficult years of Spanish economic isolation, the Govern-
ment' s virtually sole concern in the faCE: of technology imports \~as 
their cost in foreign currency g:i ven this COU11try' s d:ifEi.culties in 
obtaining this ( 6). But, with the expansion of the SL"<tieS and the 
consequent acceleration in the purchase of foreign technology, a new 
conce..>n arase, in connection with the so-called technology transfer 
agreements' contents, espec:ially concerning their rest.rictive clauses; 
th:is meant that, as early as 1965, there was an initial regulation 
•. /1 .. 
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which sought to avoid such clauses by means of tentative administra-
tive control (7) . 
The studies carr.i.ed out dur:ing the sixties and into the early seventies 
show that those initial regulations hardly affected the content of the 
agreements (8). to the point where the restrictive situations were not 
very different in this country to those known elsewhere in developing 
nations, as can be seen from Table 1. This led to t.'le need to develop 
a more active policy which took from in a new control framework 
on technology transfer, developed from 1973 onward and whose content 
may be summarized as follows, (9) 
This is based on the assumption that the conculsion of technology 
transfer agreements by Spanish companies may involve social costs 
or undesirable los ses for the Spanish economy not compensated 
by the private benefi.ts of the transaction. This made public inter-
, 
vention advisall:;e in order to supervise theselection and acquisition 
of foreign technology, as well as the types produced. so that 
the application of that technology would have maximum utiJization 
in the domestic economy. 
The administrative mechanisr'n created is a Technology Transfer 
Contracts Register in which all agreements concluded by Spar.ish 
resident companies must be entered. This registration may be refused 
if there are restrictive clauses in the contracts. although exceptions 
may be made; this is particularly the case with technology for 
the production or use of equipment for defense . 
The list of contractual clauses inc1udes a wide range of cases. 
from the prohibition of exports to third count..'":ies to "binding" 
purchases of capital goods, and covering compulsory transfer of 
patents, ünprovernents or innovations introduced by the Recipient, 
or developed by it, on the basis of the acquisition cf foreign 
technology etc. L'1 1981, the number of restrictive clauses was 
reduced, (e. g. transfer of obsolete technology, input over-billing 
linked to the transfer provided by the transferer); blit sorne new 
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cases ",ere introdueed, sueh as the transfer of polluting teehnology, 
those exeessively intensive in energy use or those replacing dornestic 
produetion with imports ( 10 l . 
The Register was, at the sarne time, to bea souree by ,qhich 
to ensure greater transpareney in the foreign technology aequisition 
rnarket, and to plan internal researeh programs towards cornplemen-
tary teehnological objectives and improvements to imported teehno-
logy( 11 l . 
Leaving to one side the criticisrns of principle of sueh a policy, the 
results of its application for more than a decade permit the following 
assertions , ( 12 ) 
al It has not lessened the rate of acquisition of foreign teehnology. 
b) The Ministry of Industry has hardly used it power to refuse 
the registration of agreements.· 
el A signiEieant nO.lmber of eontracts with restrictive clauses has 
been admitted. It is true that their frequeney has dropped off, 
but there is a suspicicn that they have been replaeed on rnany 
oceasions by "Gentlemen I s Agreements". 
d l The data bank available has not be used to orientate teehnology 
policy. 
el There hava aeen oureaueratic and eoordination problems with the 
different admini'3trative stages involved in information on and regis-
tration of the agreements. 
f) The reduction in the mean costs of the agreernents vaunted by 
the Ministry of Industry and Energy is at the very least open 
to debate. In fact, this assertion is sustained with payment 
forecasts in the agreements themselves, and this does not tie 
in with investigations available on payments rnade ( 13 ) . 
This brings us to the present situation, in which that technology 
transfer policy rnust be rethought. Apart frorn the reasons already 
6. 
given, such a revision must be made in view of the new context 
of the modemization of Spanish industry, the increase in producti-
vity and the new competitive situation in which it is to develop 
as a result of the increasing opening-up of the Spanish economy; 
the entry to the EEC is just the most visible external expression 
of this process. 
As is almost always the case, the discussion is debated between 
two positions: those who entrust everything to market forces , for 
whom the best policy is the absence of intervention, and those others 
who, while admitting the need to update mechanisms, think that a 
certain government presence is necessary so as to correct the worst 
defects of complete de-regulation, especially in a field such as techno-
lbgy where the uncertainty of results and the imbalance' of points 
of departure make it more difficult for the market control forces 
to operate. 15 it possible, in all this discussion, to throw any further 
light, following the examination of the defense sector' s experience? 
Before we go into details, certain facts should be recalled on the 
development of this sector in Spain. 
2.2 Policy Development Lines on the Spanish Defense Industry 
Following the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), there was a first moment 
in which the autarchic projects also reached - in a particular ma'1ner-
the military industries. In fact, as the result of initial doubts as 
to intervention in the Second W::n:d War and, subsequently, of international 
isolation, a policy was developed of increasing domestic military 
production as far as possible. The National Institute of Industry 
(INI) , formed in 1941, played a fundamental role in this target. 
There was a first major change in 1953 when the military bases agree-
ment was signed with the U.S.A. From that time on, the moderni-
zation of the armed forces was ca..rried out on the basis of materials 
f...rom North American aid. This improvement in matériel scarcely affec-
ted the technological advance in the Spanish military industry, because 
( 
____________________________________________ ~J1 
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oí its very tenuous relation with a wholly extemal set of resources. 
In so me cases. this improved armament supply (on the other hand, 
somewhat obsolete) even caused a reduction in our small technological 
potential because the domestic industry was no longer required to 
produce new arms. 
Throughout the sixties, ::t was gradually realized that it was necessary 
to modify this excessive dependence on the US: a decisive element 
in this process was the sense of frustration on the part of the Spanish 
military on verifying t11at the North American arms could not be 
used in the last colonial confJ.icts against Marceco (BIst SrD1-IFNI 
and, later, the SAHARA). 
1t was necessary to wait for the seventies in order to see the forma-
ticn of a new policy to boost the Spanish defense industry. On t..l-:le 
most obvious level, this policy was illlplemented with the reorgani-
zation and promotion of the main arms compan.ies: CONSTRUCCIONES 
AERONAUT1CAS, S.A. (CASA), ·EMPRESA NACIONAL BAZAN and EMPRESA 
NACIONAL SANTA BARBARA. As well, sorne of t.t:·.e Research Centers, 
most notably the Center for Technical Studies of l1atériel ( CETME) 
were given a boost(14). 
From the productive and technological point of view, the qualitative 
change was marked by the beginning of production urfder license 
of new arms, frem 1971 onwards. It must be remembered that this 
began a diversification away from the US: the 
to be France (the AMX 30 combat tank is the most 
major partner was 
significant product). 
From the institutional point of view, the transition to a democratic 
system of govemment was to promote changes of the greatest impor-
tance. Without doubt. the most important was the creation of the 
Minist...ry of Defense. uniting the three previous Army. Navy and Air 
Force Ninistries. Within this Ministry. the Director-General of Arms 
and Matériel (DGAM) was created. to play a decisive role m tl,e 
new notion of war matériel procurement, assuming a broad range of 
transfer frem previously dispersed bodies. There were to be later 
.. / / .. 
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steps of signifieanee, sueh as the preparation of the National Strategic 
Plan, the ereation of the Arms and Matériel Advisory Commission, 
and the passage of the Budget provisions Aet for Investment in and 
Maintenanee of the Armed Forees (1982) whieh made funds available 
for the period from 1983 to 1990. 
For the purposes of this paper, the new defense poliey will be speei-
f:i.ed in two types of basie action; procurement policy and R & D 
poliey. The fundamental. point of departure for both is the Armed 
Forees Modernization Plan whieh, in addition to providing an import 
re-adjustment in the total Army numbers, foresees a set of projects 
for the modernization and procurement of matériel, of which the most 
outstanding are the following: 
The ereation of a new eombat group for the Navy, based on the air-
craft carrier "Principe de Asturias" and provided with new FFG-7 fri-
gates. 
The procurement of three' further Descubierta class eorvet"tes and 
three Galerna sub marines . 
Purehase of Harrier aircraft and ASM helicopters. 
Development of the FACA program (Future Combat Aircraft) with 
the evaluation of the F/A-18 Hornet and Tornado aircraft. 
The importanee of the "Combat Grande 3" a'1d "Combat Grand-= 4" pro-
grams connected with the air control and alert networks· in the 
Soutb. of Spain and the Canary Islands. 
Spain' s intention to participate in all the stages of the European 
project for a future combat ai.---craft (ACA). 
The idea is to give maximum participation to domestie industry for 
which, if neeessary, a boost will be given to the procurement of 
technology and the know-how required for production in Spain. The 
means for determining the aeeess ehannels to the produets and teehno-
9. 
logy is summarized in graph no. 1, fram which it is seen that there 
are four main routes: 
Manufacture under license 
Joint production 
Joint manufacture 
Own R & D 
Until recentiy, the most commonly used of these was ma.'1ufacture 
under J;~ÉnsÉ; however, the plan provides ,that the best way oc 
getting access to advanced t!,chnology is through joint production 
and joint manufactJ.:re, which may remove sorne of the most important 
probl.ems oc manufacture under license (15) . 
All this must be backed up by greater attention to R & D at t:he 
local level - with the bcost given by the Research Centers - and 
by an export promotion policy. In fact, the resources given ove.;: 
to R & D were to rise sharply from 1985 onwards; similarly, expo.rts 
have li.'1dergone a substantial increase, from 12 million dollars 1.., 
1977 , to 332 million dollars in 1983 (at contant values). This re-
presents a significant penetration oc markets, frem 0.1 % of all Third 
World impereS in 1977 to 3,8 % of their =rr.s imporeS L'1 1983 (16) • 
The main e;¡port products are set out on Table n. 
.. /; .. 
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Sou:t'ce: Tecnología Militar no.4, 1986 
Th~l new defense policy is financially backed by a incree.sing budget 
for military outlay. This growth is not reflected in the overall 
defense data which, in the perlod 1980-87, rose an average of only 
1,6 % per annum, in real terms. However, against the virtual stagna-
tion of personnel payments (up 0.8 % per annum -in real terms) and 
of goods and sarvices procurement (up 0.7 % per almum in real terms) 
arms procurement items have risen an ave:::age of 6,9 % per annum 
in real terms in the eighties, 'Ñith a pa.rticu.la.ry marked in=ease 
in 1980-83, when the annual average rate of increase was 7.9 % (17) . 
These are thus the components of the basic situation, on which we 
embark on a more deta;Jed descrlption of Spanish military technology • 
. . ! / .. 
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3'.- THE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPANISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
The _Spanishdefense jndusJ;¡-y __ haS ,therefore, undergone a mayor trans-
formation.cn:l.; with that, its technological level and its links with otherO 
indU$tr:ialsectors. However, befare making a more detailed examination 
of the arms systems, it must be recalled that the relations of the 
armed forces with the national economy CQver a broad range of possibi-
lities beyond just arms. In the case of Spain, on-going attention 
to a group of more than 300,000 persons requires procurement of 
many and varied products. If 1982 is taken by way of a sample, 
we are able to list 569 army contracts with the widest variety of 
sectors, in order to acquire, amongst other things, workshop equip-
ment, plate, tooling, paint, pharmaceutical products, measuring equip-
ment, const..-uction machinery" furnishings, computers, motor-cycles, 
br~ad, pres.erves, fabrics, footwear, straw" animal feed, surgical 
equipment, etc.' This year, the number of civilian supply companies 
will reach the figure of 877. 
If we rerer to the strictly milita..ry fi.eld, links with civiEan industry 
are =eated basically through a twin mechanism: . the participation 
, 
of other inC\ustr;ial sectors in parts or inputs in military industry, 
,and the civilian application of technology to products developed in 
the first instance in the defense sphere. In ord= to explain sorne 
of these realities adequately in Spain, we bave divided the Spanish 
military industry into three sub-groups: '. tbe State arms i!1dU$try , 
J~) 
the standard prívate defense sector,51 and auxiliary defense, indU$tries. 
3.1 The State Arms Industry 
Integrated into tbe INI group, these companies have a total share 
capital of almost 48,000 million pesetas, ~d sales of sorne 220,541 
mill.ion, of w hich a.bout half go to overseas markets. They have a 
payroll of 38,295 persons and plants throughout Spain; they work 
mainIy in the fields of ground arms, a.erospace, vehicles, vessels 
and electronics (see Table 3). 
1 
13. 
The Spanish defense industry integrated into the INI group has acquired 
technological capability by means\:1)of the procurement of technology 
overseas, together with its own R & D processes, beginning the deve-
lopment of its own advanced technology products. It should be mention-
ed that most of these compani.es began their main activity in the 
civilian field; as time has gone on, and given the scant demand for 
their products, together with a.'l incre::lSe in the demand for defense 
matér:i.el, their military involvement has increased to stand at high 
percentages . 
The following are some of their most important develüpments, .pam-
cu1arly taking account of their relaticns with civ:ilian industry. 
'l'abie no. 3 
VARIABLE DATA OF DEFENSE INDUS'l'RY INI (1984) 
. 
Eqll ity ca- Personnel Manufacture 'fotal r'-lCport I Pl'oduc ic¡;: pital total % Technicialls H + O illcome (miUions Factories I per r:: ~ il (milliofls) Area tro' iQQ¡ ""~) ( millions) ,. . ¡------ i "In ::11 , ------- ... 
SB 2,150 3,870 21,36 Armament 11011 211,095 111,0811 uviedo/Toledo 6K~· .. 
Ammullitioll (1981) Coruila/Palellcia 
SeVilla/Granada 
-- 1- . -
EESA 1,500 455 21,31 Electr'onics 62 2,881 1130 Hadrid 6 ., . - . 
equi¡:mellt alld (1981 ) Ilarcelolla 
elements 
____ o 
EISA , 1,625 657 211,35 Professiollal 256 5,632 2,113 Nadrid 8.5. 
elec tronics 
-- -
"_ BrlZJ\!'! 9,1150 13,5"(1 23.57 Ships I engu les I 68 76,896 28,309 La CorllF", 5 KtKf~! 
tir~binÉs, gtu 18 ( 1980 furcia 
Cádiz 
ENOSA 1,500 638 21,31 Optics, preci- 711 221111 , 32 ~!admid 3.51 
SiDO mecanics 
-
CASA 11,1185,86 10,037 24.53 Aerospacc 1,050 113,365 36,7 111 Nadrid 3.6b 
Sevilla 
Cádiz 
-
CEl1'lE 575 4611 -- H+O JIl Defense -- 1.1172 82 ~1adrid 3,1'1 
materials 
. 
ENJ\SA 2ó J 50U 8,603 20,9 'l'rucks I eng:ÍJles 2,200 63,956 21,122 ~1adrid 7. 11 3 
anllOul'cd vehi-
clea 
... -
Source: INI allnual reports 1981¡ - Take" from RANNlNGER (1987) 
15. 
In EMPRESA NACIONAL BAZAN, should be higlilighted the construction 
of the largest ship in its history - the a:ircraft carrier "Prlnc:ipe 
de Asturias". An original US design has been modified and adapted 
by the company, and an, important group of civilian comparries is 
participating: ENSIDESA (steels), ASTILLEROS ESPAÑOLES (auxiliary 
machinery) , ALeAN and ENDESA (plating and aluminum sections), 
TUBACEX (piping), FIDRAS MINERALES (insulation), ANGLO NAVAL 
INDUSTRIAL (cooling systems) , TUBOS REUNIDOS (steel piping) , 
PIRELLI and ROQUE (electric wiring) , and a further large number 
of_c"mpanies. 
This company also destines sorne technologiqU developments obtained 
,1 av,))(¡ 
by the military sector into the civilian sphere. Mention may thus 
be made of development on high speed ship forms, studies for 
a floating electrical power station, and the project for exploitation 
of. wave energy, ship StructurES and propulsion control. 
The most important case in recent years has been that of EMP RESA 
NACIONAL SANTA BARBARA, and the project for the license-production 
of' the French AMX-30 combat tank. The par--icipating companies, 
with their percentages, are shown in graph no. 2. The actual pre-
sence of civilian industry exceeds the estimated' percentages, ':~~cÉ 
o ~,' -, ,;( 
dp.fense COlT!panies incorporate a large number of components frem 
the civilian field; and all the plant, prod1.lctí.on line, .etc._ are 
manu:e¡;¡ctured by civilian industries. 
. . / / .. 
/ 
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CONSTRUCCIONES AERONAUTICAS S.A. (CASA) provides other important 
examples: 
Its C-212 Aviccar, so successful in its military missions, is also 
sold for civilian applications. Also, there is the new project between 
CASA and the Indonesian fum of NURTANIO, for the CN-235, designed 
equally for civilian and for military use. 
/V (j:' ""'/ s' 
In addition to the improvements made to the aircraft developed 
. by it - C-212 , C-lOl and CN-235 - CASA has worked in the creation 
of a materials laborato::}' ~i:or civiJian and military uses ,in the "". 
development of new materials technology (CASA patent for application 
in the civilian Airbus 320 program), the development of a robo-
tized system (for civiJian and military use), automation of the 
production line, a project for a wire rolling system, cooperation 
with Universities and National Bodies, etc. This is all at the same 
JJJJJJ~,JJ \ 
time . as continuing with international collaboration, with important 
foreign manufacturers in both the civiJian an9 military fields, for' 
the production of components for a large number of au:craft and 
helicopters (Mirage F-l, BO-I05, Airbus 300, Airbus 310, Airbus 
300-600, Falcon 10, Falcon 20, Super Puma, Gazzelle, BoÉin~f B-757, 
DC-9, OC-lO) .. giving CASA international technological prestige .. It 
is, as well, collaborating in the space field. 
i~kApA and ENOS.jIj provide le55 well-knüwn examples. This is the 
case of -the improvements made to ENASA I s civ:iJ.ian vehicles as 
a result of its experience in the military field, and in ENOSA I s 
optics developments , including microscopes, binocular magnifi.ers, 
telescopes, etc. In both cases, the possibility of many of the techno-
logical efforts would be difficult to imagine without the demand 
and specilications for defense products and the associated captive 
market. 
. .// .. 
COMPANIES 
Casa 
Bazán 
Enesa· 
Eisa 
Eesa 
Enosa 
-
Sta. Bárbara 
--
Cet."lle 
l8. 
EISA and EESA. both in the eleetronie sector. operate in standard 
twin use teehnology. like many others in this refened to below. 
The importanee of this sector in the new defense-civil industry 
relationship is seen from the fact that the National Electronics 
Plan foresees almost 50 % of our elect:ronic output going to defense 
by the end of this decade. 
, 
Through traini.'1g and the teehnologieal efforts organized, there have 
been major advanees. with a relatively solid base for entry to 
international markets. It will be shown that there still remains 
a great deal to be done, but one measure of what has been aeroeved 
is found in military teehnology offered for export by the INI compa-
nies. and presented in the "Teehnology Catalog". Table 4 summar:izes 
this teehnology. 
Tab1e no. 4 
OFFER OF EXPORTABLE NILITARY TECHNOLOGY 
- IN! (1984\ 
Various Military I Milita...-y IEX P10-
sives ~d armament Warships Aircraft vehicles 'elect:ro- Optics I Serviees 
ammuru- nies tion . 
-
-- -- --
7 
- -- -
~ 
- --
8 -- -- -- -- 2 
- -
-- 4 -
-- - -
-
- . 
-- - -
4 
- -
J 
2 I 4 -- 2 - 7 - --
- -- -- - - -- 3 --
I I I - I -- -- - -- -- - I --'¡ J 
I I 
J 
14 13 -- -- -- 1 1 J --
I I ! 
j 
i 
! 
, 
I 
NOl'E: CASA offers ita C-212 , C-101 ana CN-235 aircraft, ana rr.a:intenance a'1a overhaul technology. Bi\ZA¡\f has prcdud:\::n 
tech&'101ogy for airc...""3.ft carriers, coast gt.1ard vessels, patrol bo~ts, sutma.rines, corvettes, frigates and 
ship repairs. ENJ\.SA has ctifferent military vehicles, ana EISA has technolcgy suc~ as autorratic knockdclm 
target sy¡¡t:=, laser teleneters and "ir traffic control syStffilS. EESJ\ offers mines, fuses of various types, 
trnnsnitters, raillotelephones, etc. ENOSA has 3 optical products ana CEINE a )'!iae range of explosives, arma 
and muniticns developed in its laooratories. 
(Source: RJ\NllL'iGER 1987) 
/ 
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These results are the outcome of a re13.tively large investigation program 
by these public companies. In spite of the difficulties in se=ing 
exact data that are up to daté, sorne aspects of their R & D activity 
may be summarized as follows: 
All assign singificant sums to R & D, which is in contrast to the 
'average situation of Spanish private industry. 
In general, they spend rather more in their own R &D than on 
acquiring overseas technology; this too is a characteristic w hich 
is different from that of the typical Spanish company. 
There is a clear re13.tionship to be seen between R & D efforts 
and a rising export level. 
Finally, there are two structural features of these companies which 
we think are of interest fortheir implications for the strategic deci-
sion-making process. In the Fi'-st place, the majority are 100 % owned 
by the INI, with the important exception of CASA, where different 
- - - , 
fDreign aircraft producers have 26 % of the share capital. The second 
refers to the INI de.fense compimies participation in other local and 
foreign companies; table 5 is a summary of this participation, high-
lighted as an important complement bQth to their production capacity 
and to their export c:apability. 
2J. 
ClMmAkI¡;;~ 01' INI-GHOUP liAsI~,d I'AHTICrrA'!'ION IN E:QUITY al' OTliEH Cl~lmAkIEp 
'>" a,N f!J;!JITY 
CAPITAL 
(MJLl..IQNS) 
S8 2,15 0 
. . - ._ .... ~JJJ~ 
EESA 17 500 
EISA 1,625 
E,IWN 9,450 
I 
i 
IBnSA 1,500 
I 
I 
I 
¡CASA 26,500 
I 
I 
IN NATIONAL 
NAME 
I 
SB Sistemas 
Defex 
Placencia 
o., ____ ._ •..••••••. _ ," •• 0·--- _ ..... '_ 
I-Cuatro 
Piher 
Isel 
rnfoleasing 
. 
Defex 
Piher 
Isel 
Infoleasing 
E.ia 
I 
Astillero G. 
Canarias 
Celastres 
CeCex 
CÉfÉK~ 
Piher 
Isel 
Hischiatti 
I 
I Purolator 
Mareoni Españ. 
Cefe." 
Chadesa 
Arianspace 
, 
: Canerc:iaJ. Pegaso 
, Jorsa 
I 
i , 
I 
COMPANIES IN I'OHEIGN 
MILLIONS % NAME 
8 50 --
412,5 10,2 
--
173.4 1,4 
", .. 
103 100 
238 34 K3~ 
--40 20 
17 775 5.6, 
412.5 10,2 Selesmar 
238 34.34 
40 20 
17 775 5.63 
100 ? Q ".v 
S.L Repara-
2'.4 100 cienes 
602.5 80 r.s.s 
412.5 10,2 Eazan, Brasil 
I 
412.5 10 .. 2 
238 6.3 
110 10 I 0.1 , la I I : 
i 
, 
I 
57 33.33 I Aircraft Technol. 
0.05 ! 0.2 Casa, Usa 
412.5 
181 10.2 
120 19.34 . 
I 1,9 I 
I 
100 100 Pegaso Chile 
250 100 Pegaso Autanatri-
ces 
55 100 Hisp. 'Jenezalano 
100 100 Cesarrollo Ind. 
1,700 81 Pegaso l'rance 
Scurce: mJK~ (1987). Prima..-y data taken from various ",U¡ual repcrt3 of INI 
-.., 
COMPANIES 
=~ 
MILLIONS • ~
-- -- I . -- --
_. 
-- --
2.5 (Pounds, 20 
I 
I 
J 
I 
14 (US-S) I 50 . 
o. 056( CÉuts~ 1~28 
Mark) 
I 20 (Cruceiros 100 
I 
I 
I 
I I '6 (US-s) 50 0.5 (Frencll 100 
!'rancs) 
I 
, ' I 
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3. 2The Standard Private Defense Industry 
Table 6 shows the civil sector defense product manufacturers. On 
occasions, these companies acquire overseas technology in order to 
- - - - - -bt..':."()"., 
have acces to new manufacturing lines but, in general, they do seeK 
- ----- JJ~K,,"J - - -- -- JEtJJ'_'J""';:>'J/J~JJJ - --
to introduce their own improvements. In the technological field where 
these industries operate they do not usually incorporate the latest 
technology, and their activity may be summarized in terms of small 
aJ:J!!s, explosives, medium and large gauge munitions, and mortars 
with their munitions. 
The __ technology_ cleyeloped or acquired for the manufacl:tu;'e of their 
- - (r_I)'''''.i') 
products is not usually applicable to the civil sector, ás this techno-
logy is usually very specif:i.cally for the munitions sector. Thus the 
effect of these indus~KKKÉs on the grawth of the civil sector can be 
seen in the jobs created, numbering so me 3.000. 
22. 
Tab1e no. 6 
PRIVATE INOUSTRY TYPICALLY OF OEF'ENSE (1982) 
Equity in Personnel Annual General use Export of 
COMPANIES millions total sales in Factorles Manufacture of techno- Defense 
millions b.Oqy products 
Astra 140 359 819 Guernica Pistols --
Lugo revolvers own 
Esperanza 30 428 7,000 Marquina iMortars and 6,500 /nortar gra own (est:imated) 
nades 
~~ 
fJ..rcraft EOS 350 159 ~,M47 Burgos -~omb char-
: ges and own 
¡;rtmery 
r=artridges 
Expal -- -- -- Vitoria Various 6,000 l Defense own 
mate"'" 1 " ,*""a 
Instalaza 540 192 ~Illl Zaragoza Grahade 616 
launchers, own 
-
. various 
-
ammo' 
Llama 160 250 653 I Vitoria Handguns, --I ri..."les own 
- ~~K 
plllcencia 173.4 469 17 588 IIndoron rntiaircraft 
. 
--
Ja.rtruery own/ 
, 
material foreign 
K~_KJ
Star 490 340 720 Eibar Pistols own -- '" ... 
Source: RANNINGER (1987) 
r 
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The Auxiliary Defense Industry 
It can be said there is a large nurnber of civilian cornpanies supply:ing 
civilian rnaterials· to the Armed Forces; :in these cases, the Spanish 
Arrny is an important recipient of products frorn the civilian area, 
and gives over a large part of its budget to the acquisition of thesé 
rnaterials, thus re-:investing sorne defense expenditure :in the civilian 
f:i.eld. 
Table 7ciassifies the 83 rnost important Spanish auxiliary defense 
cornpanies; they are divided :into sectors . according to activity (20) • 
It is feature of these cornpanies that, 0ften, they have the latest 
r I L". . 
technology . available; of particular note is the R & D work done by 
ISA (auxiliary aviation rnechanics cornponents), AISA (aeronautics cornpo-
nents) , ARESA· (Surveillance launches and study of new rnaterials) , 
ASTILLEROS VIUDES (a variety of vessels), TALBOT (tank conversion 
technology) , CECSA (design an9 production of a variety of electronic 
equipment), CHACONSA (a hovercraft, in collaboration with the Navy) , 
GAELICO (its own alpha-number equiprnent systern), HISPANO RADIO 
MARITIMA (radio-telephones and radars), RYMSA (different types of 
antenna), SAINCO (tactical cornbat simuJ.ators), SENER (laser guided 
bornbs), etc. 
It should be po:inted out that the tAchnology devslo;;¡ed or o.c<;¡UÍred 
by these cornpanies for application :in the output of military products 
is also used for production :intended for the civilian sector, as is 
the case with almost all the cornpanies referred to proviously. 
Sorne cornpanies manufacture under license, as is the case with the 
AMX-30 combat tank elernent suppliers ;"ISA (brakes and shock absor-
bers) , CETASA (j,.>recision gears) , UGO (gearboxes), FORT-70 (clutch 
hcusing and discs) , dK~MEpA (rniscellaneous cornponents), etc. Table 
no. 7 shows those companies which generally use foreign technology 
for the production of their materials. 
. .// . · 
, 
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Others, with part of. their share capital foreign owned, have easy 
access to technolDgy developed by their parent companies - MARCONI 
(76 %), SESA (57 %), BRESSEL (73 %), MOTOR IBERICA (55 %), LAND 
ROVER (47 %), FEMSA (98 %), PIRELLI, TUDOR (25 %), etc. 
However, in many of the above cases, it can be seen that the techno-
lDgy level reached has been the result· of assimiliation of technolDgy 
acquired overseas which has enabled the company to obtain its capa-
bility. One of the most significant cases is CECSA - COMPAÑIA DE 
ELECTRONICA y COMUNICACIONES, S.A., which began its operations 
by colJaborating with fereign companies rich in the latest technology 
in the military electronics field. With a team of 50 engineers and 
200 speciaJjsts, it has achieved parallel R & D which enables the 
company te make highly qualified electronic defense systems. 
, . 
Table no. 7 
COMPANIES COLLABORATING IN DEFENSE PRODUCTS (1982) \ Ji 
NQ EquUy ~ foreign Alulual Manufact. MalJufact. Services/ USE of Export of Pé.\illlCllt 
mJr~\ Locatioll Irac torie, capital partíc. in Persolulcl lnvoiciJlg of CQllpo- oC end technical foreign IX!fense iI + [1 
cquity ca- 1982 nents products support technolo- products 
pital millions gy 
M[LI'l'ARY AElú-
NAlfI'ICS 
Aeronáutica llld. Madl'id 1 100 O 219 391 VES VES VES YES -- --
--
PAfll'S fDR AffI'I-
LLERY AND HCCllliTS 
Forjas y Aceros Reinasa 1 2,772 O 2,26B 7,B73 VES VES NO HO -- --
Gamesa - VltOl'ja 1 11117, O 350 1,519 VES VES NO NO - --
lasa Iluesca 1 2~M O 225 I 671 NO VES NO NO O --
, 
. 
SIIIP Clk~"rerCT1Mk 
Astilleros Heuni-
dos Bar'celona 1 15 O 7~ 2110 NO VES NO tD 35 --
AstUleros Hodl'13'UI Vigo 1 -- - 8~ 2B3 NO VES NO NO 69 --
Astillerus Viudcs Barcelona 1 - - -- - NO YES NO UNKNOWN - --
Astilleros Celaya Vizcaya 1 - -- --- -- NO VES NO UNKNOWN - -
Chaconsa Murcia 2 58 O 82 1139 NO VES NO NO - --
; 
.LEC!'JmICS-0P1'IQ' -
Cecsa Madrid 1 500 O 255 1,100 VES VES YES YES - -
Incosa ~l&II'id 1 -- -- --- - VES VES VES VES -- --
I'urotrónica Madrid 1 90 O 130 1,063 YES VES VES lJNKNOWN - -- I 
Gaelico La COl'uilli 1 --- -- --- --- VES YES NO NO -- -- 1 
Mal'coni MadI'id 1 1,11011 '16 2,900 7,958 YES YES YES VES -- 302 " 
I\ymsa Madrid 1 30 O 113 2113 NO VES NO rkhkl\~¡ -- - I I 
He'l(jair Madl'id 3 9 O 110 97 VES VES VES NO -- -- I 
Sesa MadI'id 5 3,065 75 15,937 38,663 VES VES NO VES -- 1,690 I 
JJ"J~JJ~ I 
J~~J_KJ
--
RtD IN A1«>1IIM&I' 
Dytasa Madrid 1 -- -- -- - VES YFS NO NO - --
Sener ~IaJrld 1 1,02B O 1,150 3)500 110 NO VES UN¡<NOWN -- --
. 
- -
i 
t! ~"J 
n M'ffi:\ 
~JJJ~JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ~J~J~ .. ~J_K_~ ... ~K 
------,---- . 
AHEA 
e~dIkEEolkdJprnu~ 
LA'lDRS 
Cccsa 
Ería 
SaulCO 
Locatiol 
f.ladr-id 
f.ladl'id 
f.lacldd 
JJJJJJ~IJJJ
J\i\111UNrnUI,AJflDEH 
Amado Laguna Rins Zaragoza 
llressel Madrid 
Plásticas Orarnil 
F'acx 
Porgasa 
Lecea 
Pirotecnia 01'0-
quieta 
8rr (Div. Explos. 
S.Sebast 
Madrid 
Orellse 
Vitorta 
Nav<Írra 
Madrid 
-------1----
f.l1J.ITAHY V8!IGLES 
'I'albot 
1 
ian 
~btol' Ibérica 
Land Rovel' 
Macasa 
f.ladrid 
BaI'celoIl 
f.ladl'id 
I33rcelon 
a 
-------+---
AUXfLIAllY AEHO-
NAtrrIGS 
Confecciones 10-
dusl-riales ~ladriJ
a 
-
leiLas Baf'celoll a 
Pensa 
Ind.Subsid.de 
Aviac. 
¡'R"U'SU 
Pire1l! 
Sevilla 
f.ladf'id 
BarcelotJ a 
N° Equity 
'actoriCf capital 
-
1 500 
1 75 
1 250 
1 
-
2 '(25 
1 30 
1 25 
1 1,065 
1 12 
1 50 
7 16,260 
1 --
6 1I,91J2 
IJ 1,730 
11 725 
1 115 
fl 5,21J2 
1 41J0 
1 
-
4 11,800 1 
~ foreign NUlual ~1¿ullú"act • 
oC canpo-partlc. in PersOIlIlel invoicing 
equity ca- 1982 lienta 
pital .. 11110119 
O 255 1,lDO VES 
O 116 325 NO 
O 6110 1,7119 NO 
- --- -
YES 
73 1, 1107 3,°13 VES 
° 
911 2'16 VES 
O 111 . 203 VES 
O IJ05 1,100 VES 
O 27 67 VES 
O 26 750 NO 
O 1,890 10,593 VES , 
-- -- . ms 
55 8,501 39,396 NO 
117 4,'177 18,500 NO 
O 3,086 12 ,56' NO 
STUDY 01' AUXfLIARY AllMAMENT INUlSTRY 
I 
O 13 171 NO 
98 5, 605 17)1100 YES 
70 870 1,960 VES 
---
-- -- NO 
98 5l)()8 19,239 ms 
f.lauufact. Services/ USE oC Export oC r~KlllE~l!l 
of Clld technical Coreign tcfense H t [) 
products support tedmolo- products 
gy 
---
VES VES VES - -
NO VES VES 
- --
VES VES rES -- --
VES NO UNKNOJoIN 118 --
VES NO Yr:S - -
VES NO UNRNOJoIN 21J --
VES NO UNRNOI>N -- --
VES NO UNRNOI'oI'/ -
° VES NO NO 
- -
VES NO NO - --
VES NO UNKNOWN 2,2011 1177 
. 
-
VES VES VES - --
YES VES VES -- 1,023 
VES YF..s NO -- 217 
VES NO NO - --
, 
YES NO NO -- -
NO NO UlIKNQi\U -- 362 
NO NO UNIQ;Qk,'Il 600 
° VES NO UN!(NOM'I -- --
00 NI) YES -- 320 
.. 
I 
I 
I 
1 
,') 
e 
,... l ,="',," N° E q uity ~ foreign 'ac todeE capital partic. i" Persolulcl AeI'K~ cquity ca-
pital 
ELEC'IlliCAL AREl\. 
Conductores Eléc-
tricos Roque Barcelolla 1 - -- -
Control y Aplica-
ciones Madrid 1 9,950 O 2,300 
FarlYa La COrtIna 1 50 O 85 
Gel teI'-Rlngsdorf Madrid 1 50 110 134 
Illdar Madrid 1 119 O 80 
Jona Lasarto 1 123 O 78 
Tudor ~1admid I1 31215 25 2¡816 , 
--
~lIuIiK ELECr!{)N! CS 
El cc trific . del 
Norte Maili'ld 1 300 O 2,3110 
EllJasa Bal'celona 1 135 9 104 
Elect:r6nica [loar Madl'id 1 12 O 112 
HisparlO llaMo Ma-
ritima ~1adrit1 2 1100 O 501 
Industl'ial Elec-
trónica ~1adrid 1 13 ~6 211 
Piller Electrón; ca MadC'id 1 70 O 258 
!>ecoinsa . Madrid 2 2/180 25 651 
MECANICS 
BendlbérIca Bc'1I'ce] ona '1 7112 65 2,195 
Ce tasa Elgoibar 1 71 O 252 
UOO Vitoria 1 220 O 276 
Port-70 Zaragoza 2 100 O 1110 
~_K 
luulual M...lIlufac t . M,mufac t . Servlces/ 
illvoicing of cQnpo- of elld technical 
1982 nents products support 
milliOllS 
--- YFS NO NO 
9,950 YFS YFS YFS 
338 YFS YFS NO 
326 YES NO NO 
707 NO YFS YFS 
3211 NO YES NO 
12,021 YFS NO NO 
. 
6,562 NO YES VES 
413 YFS NO NO 
2 YFS NO NO 
1,755 YFS YFS NO 
107 YFS NO NO 
2,150 YFS NO NO 
11,2211 NO VES YFS 
9,9112 YFS NO NO 
010 YFS NO NO 
0119 YES NO NO 
1100 YES NO NO 
USE of E.xport of 
foreign I:efense 
techIlo1o- products 
gy 
IJNKNO\-.N 
--
IJNKNO\-.N 3,450 
NO -
NO -
NO 
-
IJNKNOWN -
1JNKN0hN 
-
IJNKNOWN --
UNHNO\-.N --
IJN](NQ\-.N 
-
IJNKNOWN -
NO 
-
IJNKNOWN 
-
IJNKNOWN 
--
NO -
IJN](NQ\-.N 
-
YFS 
--
UNlQlo\-.N 
-
m¡~,íT~lll 
H + D 
3 
B 
--
--
-
--
170 
--
--
-
--
--
78 
--
---
163 
--
-
-
I 
I 
1 
! 
, 
J 
I 
1 
, 
1 
IJ 
• I 
'--' E q uity % forelgn tI O 
Lccatiúll a e tol'ie, capital pal'tic. in Pcrsolulel AHE:4 
equity ca-
pital 
-
NEI'ALUffiGY 
At1aibra B.:u-'celona 1 90 O 175 
'fubacex Llodio 2 2,304 O 1,121 
IJ1(lox ¡.éroida 1 79 O 128 
Acesa Vitoda 1 - -- --
Máquinas Coser 
Alfa EllJac 1 725 O 1,250 
Nueva Montai1a 
Quijano S¡;mtéulder 2 3,OOJ O 2,250 
Talleres Arago-
neses Zaragoza 1 185 O 87 
, 
\JIIJXILlARY SHIP 
!XJNS'l'i11JCTICI'I 
Aux1trol Madri<l 1 5'-
" 
O 53 
Ebroacero za¡'agoza 1 8~K O 2'10 
Gmber Hnos. Vizcaya 1 7~, O 110 
~!Ik BaE~ct!lolla 1 I¡ /2"9 3 2,658 
Navalips Maddd 2 60 50 1'10: 
Iluurod Metzeler Thwct. lona 1 - -- --
VARIaJS PIDruCTS 
Autógena Martinez Madrid 6 304 O 39'1 
Altor Vizcaya 1 28 O 118 
Esab Ibérica MacJrid 1 21¡0 .75 289 
Fimesa Madrld 1 -- --- ---
Gal\Y Pontevedl'a 1 125 O 130 
Industria Cor-
chera Bertrán Gcl'Ülla 2 '131 O 209 
Manufac turas 
Cal"rero GerOllU 1 0 .. 6 O 12 
-- '-_._---.- ----
AJUlual Mal llLfact • rolaJlufact. Scrvices/ 
.illvoicing oC canpo- oC elld tedUlical 
1982 lIents products support 
millions 
6'13 VES NO NO 
11,79'1 'lES NO NO 
653 NO VES NO 
- NO 'lES NO 
3,216 'lES NO NO 
~'I ,960 'lES 'lES NO 
23~ 'lES NO NO 
220 'lES NO NQ 
1,250 'lES NO NO 
-- 'lES NO I'l\ 
10,053 'lES NO NO 
1,005 'lES NO NO 
-"- 'lES NO NO 
1.772 NO 'lES NO 
338 NO 'lES NO 
, 1 '/171 VES NO NO 
-
NO 'lES NO 
650 'lES NO NO 
7'19 VES NO NO 
---- YES NO NO 
--c' 
USE of E.:x;-ort :,: 
Corelg1l ~fÉnsÉ 
technolo- prúGucts 
f!:f 
lJNKNCI.VN --
lJNKNCI.VN --
NO 
-
lJNKNOWN - --
NO -
NO -
NO --
NO --
NO 
-
NO 
--
NO 
--
NO" 
-
lJNKNOl-IN 
--
NO 
-
NO 146 
\JNKNOM1 
-
NO --
UNJ;NO,IN 
-
rkJmleI~ -
NO -
\ :-2:_ ::"/..;. ~ t 
:,¡ ~ L· 
I 
-
20 
-
-
39 
10 
5 
O 
-
--
68 
-
--
" 
--
16 
-
-
--
-
T 
t 
i 
I 
i ¡ 
I 
i 
NO E q uity ~ Corelgll NUlual NaJlufact. !>k'muf ac t • Servicesl USE of Export of Pajl!/ellt. 
MillA Locat.ion factorief capital partíc. in PersOIulel :UIVoicing of conpo- oC end technica1 foreign refense t~ + ro I 
eQu1ty ca- 1982 Ilents pl'OdllCts support technolo- pmdllCts ! 
pita1 millions gy i 
, 
CIlEMICAL PHO[lJCfE 
Barnices Va1ent:Ul Barcelona 1 1100 50 601 11,447 VES NO NO NO UUKNOWN 'la 
Brugamlas furcelona 1 16 o 112 776 VES NO NO NO UNKNOWN --
Glasurit Hadrid 2 323 99 '{al 4,950 VES NO NO NO UNl<NO\oJN -
Iloechst Ibérica N<Jdri<J - -- -- -- - VES UO NO NO UNKNOWN -
VARIWS VElITCLES 
FruehauC !>k'1ddd 1 250 O 250 1,688 NO YES NO NO VES -
~u3rcÉdÉ8 Benz Madrid 1 4,176 ,9 511 3,929 
. 
27,1111 NO VES NO NO VES 263 
'rarAIS 135 82,239 83,6113 330)553 
----
r 1~1i N lv'tN 6-E« (\<l'¡¡ ~i 
Source: Own made-up fro.u data received from companies 
td 
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The electronic sector groups a major set of companies which are, 
yet agam, a olear example of the application of military technology 
in the civilian field. The following can be singled out from amongst 
the most important: 
* CESELSA, 
* SAINCO: 
* TEKTRONIK: 
* C.D .. E .. ELECTRONICA S .. A .. : 
* ENSA, 
* EUROTRONICA S.A., 
* PAGE IBERICA: 
* OTEMA: 
Radar systems, flight simulators, using 
its own technology, or technology de-
veloped in cooperation with the Uni-
versities. 
Automatic operation simulators, compu-
temed electronic systems, remote con-
trols. 
a mulitnational. Graphic data process-
ing, communications, digital products 
and measuring inst-rumentation. 
Rectifiers, converters, power SUppliHS. 
Local technology. 
This company belongs to the group by 
CESELSA. Direction fi..¡1ders. The com-· 
pany has i:s own technology. 
Communications, electro medicine , na-
val electrol1ics and teletransmission. 
Radiocommunications units and units 
for Air TrafEic Control. 
Mobile radio-communications, repea-
ter stations, ground-to-air equipment. 
From expierence outside the electronic sector, mention should be 
made of the company CHACONSA which has, en order fram the Defense 
Ministry, developed an amphibious vehicle on the basis of a project 
for research into vehicle technelogy on air cushiens, knewn as hover-
craft, a'1d with possible civilian applications. 
. .// . · 
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3.4 Current Defense Programs and their effect on Civilian Industry 
'Table 9 shows the main programs for defense which as a whole, exceed 
one thousand billion pesetas. For the most part, this financial effort 
goes overseas, as local industry lacks the technological capability 
which is able to meet the needs of the Spanish armed forces; thé 
most favorable case is that of EMPRESA NACIONAL BAZAN which is 
able to meet 60-70 % of its programs. 
It seems that, in this situation, the decision has been to import 
the foreign technology which makes it possible to manufacture as 
much as possible in this country and, in the cases where this is 
not possible - as in the FACA program - to raise trade compensation 
as far as possible, even to including non-military industry. 
One of the most important problems facing the companies for partici-' 
pation on better terms in these programs :is the lack of planning 
by the Ministry of Defense wh'ch, when it announces its decision, 
leaves virtual:i.y no time in whlch to adjust th<;> local industry - and 
even less so in order to compete with the big international companies. 
On the other hand, there is clearly a very low level of par'".icipation 
by private local companies, which reduces the capacity to sprElad 
the impact on the industrial network. 
The development of these new programs, and the formula used, will 
-, ¡, .-' - -
irl-(:¿lve a major increase in the level of techno:i.ogical complexity 
in military matériel which, because of the capacity of our industry, 
will mean a reduction in the rate of national supply." This means 
,that for some industries the future 100,5 somewhat bleak and it will 
be difficult to speak in this country of a real military-industr"Ó-al 
complex such as may exist in more deveoped cou."rtr'..es . 
. . ! ! .. 
Program 
Project 
FACA 
Antitank 
'lIIissiles 
l\ntiaircr:aH 
Illissiles 
Heücopters 
rranks 
éliJable 
daet in 
lllons 
Av 
bu 
mi 
pe setas 
J 25,000 
30,000 
35,000 
1 18,000 
--
1 30,000 
JO,OOO Otller pro-- 41 
grams 
( varJous 
slüps) 
ALLOCi\TED 
McDonnell 
(USA) 
not yet de-
cided 
possibly-
TOI'l or /lO,!'1 
Euromissile 
( Frencll--
German) 
not yet de-
cided 
nat yet de-
cided 
not yed de 
cided 
Source; RANNU¡GER (1987) 
Table no. 9 
MAIN DEFENSE PROGRMJS AT MEDIUM 'fERM 
NATIONAL A V AILABILl'l'Y OF PARTICIPATING 
MANUFAC- 'I'ECI-INOLOGY NATIONAL 
TURES TRANSFER MANUFACTURER 
NO F'light simulatorl -CASA;CECSA 
automatic anaIyser 
s tabilizer / lead ing 
edge flap/leading 
edge extension 
NO Planned for missili Santa Bárbara or 
Talbot 
NO Engine: 6000war Santa Bárbara 
heads, parts, ENOSA 
chassis, mounting EISA 
NO Planned CASA 
new national 
manufacturer 
-
NO Acquisition of Santa Bárbara 
technology planned 
for 'national manll-
facture 
YES Planned BAZAN 
(60 ta 70%) 
j 
, 
COM PENSATIONS FINAL TECIlNOLO--
TO TAKE PLACE GICAL RESULT 01· 
MANUFACTURE 
US-$ 1 ,800 million IMPORT WITH 
1981 SCARCE NATIONA), 
PARTICIPA1'ION 
Planned Probably, NNflO-
NAL MANUFAC1'UI, E 
WI'l'H FOREIGN 
'fECHNOLOGY 
12 , 500 million NATIONAL I1ANU-
pesetas FAC,!'URE WU'II 
FOREIGN 'rECHNO-
LOGY 
Planned Probably' HlPOW l' 
WITH SCARCE N/I.-
TIONAL PARTICI-
PATION 
--
unknown Probably: 1'11\'1'10--
NAL MANUFACTUh' 
WITH FOREIGN 
TECHNOLOGY 
--
unknown Probably, NNfl' 
NAL I1ANUFAC1'11' 
WITH INCORPORó'. 
TION OF 3D', n" 
EIGN TECHNOU" 
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3.5 Other Considerations on the Technological Standard 
So far, sorne of the main technological achievements have been set 
out of the Spanish military industries, normally by means of a combina-
tion of technology importation ando their own research efforts. In large 
part, these achievements are refLected in the sector' s e1{portl:"hythm. 
However, there are other important elements which must be taken 
into account in assessing the overall situation of the sector, since 
the tJ;uth is less positive than might by thought frem the picture 
painted above. 
technological level is in the small number 'of 
Spanish companies in the field, and in their 
highly illuminating in this sense. 
A major cause of this situaticn is the Ireduced R & D potential.\ .. In 
particular, it must be borne in mind that, notwithstanding the progress, 
the situation in the research centers leaves much to be desired, 
for the following reasons, amongst others: 
Lack of resources in technology research centers 
Low proportion of high-qua]jfication stafE 
I The absence of a research personnel training policy 
Low level of funds and subsidies frem the government 
On occasion, peor distribution of government funds which have 
ravored the companies over the research centers which, neverthe-
less, do take a longer term view. 
Low level of cooperation between Military and Civilian Research 
Centers. 
The lack of electronic research laboratories of sorne scale . 
. . / / . · 
COflPANY 
CASA 
EESA 
ES?E!WlZA 
I 
I 
I 
I 
¡,;<PAL 
I 
Sl'AR 
rkpT~KiAZA 
I 
I \ 
\ LLA.'o\A 
TALB1\' 
\ 
'rable no. 10 
PATENTS OF THE ARMAMENT NATIONAL INDUSTRY 
(Until December 1983) 
NUMBER OF 
PRESENTED TITLE SORT OP PATENT APPLICA 
PATENTS TrON 
APPLIED PATENT 
POR !:ATE 
2 -Manufacture oC OOnQ- Letters paten!: 2.12.83 
lithic pieces 
-Aerodynanic prefil. MOdol of utility 24.11.78 
2 -Proxlmity fuze Letters paten:" 16.07.80 
-Chronoelectronics fuze Modol of utility 16.07 .80 
19 -Perfect1oning of fuzes MOdel oC utility 20.09.83 
-<'!atrix proyectile Model oC uti1ity 20.09.83 
- Illuninating grenade Model oC utility 20.09.83 
-PerCection oC projec- MOdel oC utility 20.09.83 
tile. 
-Improvements in pro- Modol oC utility 20.09.83 
jectiles 
-Perfection oC mortara Letters patent 4.09.68 
-?erfection oC IOOrtars Letter. patent ~KM9K68 
-Perfection ot' fuzes Letters patent 19.04.67 
-Improved fuze Letters patent 19.0 •• 67 
-F'uz:e e."<:plcding in air Lette...ns patent 9.02.78 
-Grer.ade exploding in Letters pateot 9.02.78 
air , 
-New IOOt'tars grenade Letters patent 9.02.78 
-Base ter mortar Adition. certif. 7.11.80 
-Improved base Lett>ers patent 17.05.80 
-<'!ecllanicel fuze Lett.rs patent 20.04.79 
-Mortar fastening !'odel oC utility 7.07 .80 
-/obrtar elev. and Cold Model oC utility 7.07.80 
ing 
-Subcaliter mortars Model oC utility 29.01. 77 
-Layont of :oortar ele- Mode:! oC utility •. 11.75 
ments 
3 -Perfection of hal'ld- Letters patent 19.05.69 
grenades 
-Improvement of con- Letters patent l.Q2.73 
tainers 
-IIand ~l1adÉ Model oC utility 10.09.70 
3 -Perfection of sights Lettars patent lS.G3.69 
-PerfectioH .of rifles Letters patent 27.C6.69 
-Security device /Ybd.el of utility 18.11.75 
6 -Firing device Letters patent 9,1)6.82 
Ji~provÉmK oC fuzes Letters patent 10.05 .82 
-Perfectioll oC igniters Letters patent I 3.08.67 -ImproVffi\. of grenades Lette!"S patent 28.03.77 
-Improvem. al' gren.ades Letters pnte.nr. 
I 
6.11.73 
-Perfection !)f g;N!nades '\u1tioo. cer'tif. 6.11.78 
4 -La:lOnt of pistola Mbdel oC utility :8.12.80 
-Perfecticll of fm Letturs patCllt 30.07.79 
I anns 
-Pis col firing Mcd.el oC util Uy 22.4.74 
-Hamler HOúel oC utylity 30.12.71 
2 -Tankhunter Letters paci;mt 21.04.83 
Jl'al'l~"untÉr tÉtt~t's patl!nt 30 .05 .8, 
34. 
UNDER USE 
UnknOWtl 
I 
Aclnitted 
YES 
Unce:" procesa 
UnI<nown 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Unlolowr1 
Unlmown 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Actnitted 
Mnitted 
Mnitted 
Under process 
NO 
Mnitted 
Under process 
Under process 
YES 
Expireá 
YES 
NO 
YES 
Yl':5 
YES 
NO 
UnkIlown , I 
UnkUOWtl I Yl':5 
\'ES 
'lES 
YES 
Un}mC'ml 
VES 
NO 
YES 
Ut UalChi'tl 
UUq\own 
-/ 
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According to this considerations, ,there is room for doubt as to 
whether, in a country such as Spain, the effect of military activity 
in the technologicalfield¡;;¡lJ}gel1.erªtE! a considerable driving force 
011. civil technological applications. We have seen examples where 
this is the case, but it cannot be generalized throughout Spanish 
arms production as a whole. There have been some achievements 
until now, by which the industry benefits more than before from 
defense prograrns, but the situation is not so positive in the field 
of the generation and dissemination of technology. 
'I'he- officiaJ response will probably consist of the promotion of 
joint-production and manufacture, as pointed out above, so giving 
new and more direct access to new technology. However, not~~vÉró­
thing is positive in this sphere, either, and the following are 
sorne of the disadvantages (22) : 
The lack of adjustment to the level of other participants rnakes 
it very difficult to rationally and optimally assimilate the techno-
. 
1091 to be transferred in joint-production programs. 
The difficulties in participating in the most advanced elements 
may turn the companies into mere subcontracters at first. leading 
to a marginal position in the subsequent removal. This is parti-
cularly dangerous if participation in sorne programs, decided 
on for political expediency, means that the few Spanish companies 
able to participate must relegate other projects of the"ir Qwn 
wh.ic'1, while, overall, less sophist.icated technolDg.icaliy speaking. 
do however enable the company to enter key fields and glDbal. 
develDpments. The most' revelant example is CASA Isla % share 
in ,the European Píghter Aircraft (EPA) • and the suspension 
of its AX tactical aírcraft project. 
Finally, it cannot be forgotten that the need to resort to foreign 
technolo91 is not only being covered by direct access but that. 
011. many occasions, use has been made of technology transfer agree-
,1 
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Table no. 11 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTRACTS IN THE MILITAR Y INDUSTRY 
I TO'fAL I FINAL PRO COMPO- use OF TeCHNI- TECHNOLO- ORIGIN OP PRODUC- ¡ 
CON- DUCT MANU NeNTS MA- PATENT, CAL GY TECHNOLOGY TION PRE-! 
TRACTS FACTURE NUFACTURE LICENSE SUPPORT DOUBLE USE MISES 
I NAVAL INDUSTRY llA,13U,2H.51 Bazán . 43 10 25 4 4 33 3J,2It.5F,1Su. 1N 
San Carlos 2 2 i 1I. lA 
Astilleros Espa- 1 1 1 IF 
nales 
"' 
ELECTRONICS 
INDUSTRY 
Eisa 8 8 3 7F. 15 
Eesa 4 2 2 2 3F, 1I 
Cecsa 1 1 1 LU 
Sener 1 1 1 lP 
Marconi 1 1 1 lA 
Bressel 1 1 LU 
AERONAUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 
Casa 25 3 4 5 13 13 10U,8I,4F.3A 
MILITARY VEHI-
eLES 
Enasa 20 2 9 2 7 11 2H.lIt.2SL!.51 I 2 
I 
I 4F,4U,lB,lA 
ARMAMSNT 
Santa Barbara 3 1 1 1 , 2F.IA 
Llama 1 1 1 1I 
Sarre.i.ros 3 3 1 2U.1H 2 
Laguna de Rins 1 l- . 1 lF 
I TOTAL I 115 20 57 13 25 70 __ A 
B = BrazU Su = SWitzerland It = ltaIy P = Poland H = Holland 
U = U.S.A. 
s = Sweden 
N = NQI'Wege J = Japan F = France A = Gennany I = United Kingdcm 
Saurce: RANlIDlGEa (1987) 
ments I the problems of which we have a1ready commented on. Table 
11 shows a summary of the main contracts carried out by the defense 
companies frem 1974-1984. We may draw the follow:ing conclusions: 
1.1- (The INI group companies are the ones which have concluded 
) \ 
t¡lost agreements I as a result of the lower technological leve1 
( 
\Jf the products made by the standard civilian defense :industry. 
2. - System component production contracts predom:inate I indicat:ing 
a major weakness :in the st...-ucture of the Spar-,J.sh :industry. 
3.- 61 % of all the agreements can be-classifiéd -a:s for "double-use" 
technology, i. e. for use equally :in the military and civilian 
.. ! / .. 
/ 
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spheres. This is, on the one hand, a positive factor, since 
it may allow for a greater dissemination of training in technology, 
but, on the other hand, them may be severe limitations in times 
Qf political tension, raisingmajor problems of continuity and 
modernization. 
4. - A reduction is being noted in the rate of new contracts over 
recent years (20 from 1979-1984, as against 94 from 1974-1978). 
refl.ecting two important facts; on the one hand, a certain techno-
logical assimilation by sorne companies and, on the other. a 
... 
change in matériel procurement policy and R & D promotion. _ 
wmch were refe=ed to previous.lY .. 
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4.- CONCLUSIONS 
It has been our aim to discuss simultaneously the type of access 
to fereign technology that the Spanish defense industry has had .. 
and the civilian irnplication arising from this. We also thus wished 
to see if it were pessible to extract any more general find::ngs 
for guidelines fer a technology transfer policy which needs revision. 
From the above, sorne positiVilachievements arerevealed, e. g.: 
1) State policy has made possible a substal1tial change in the si-
tuation in the -defense industry over 15 years. It is true that it 
is a special sector, given the government' s capacity to directly 
influence it, even applying force, as is the case of the public 
corporations, to sorne 6.1<tent. However, not all fieIds where there 
, 
is great state influence: have seen the positive effects arising 
frem clear technology Pl:omotion policies; examples inclllde trans-
port.-communications. mhing, etc. 
2) The means of access to foreign technology have been better adjust-
ed to the industry' s possibilities and requirements. Once more 
he.re, the government' s presence and its negotiation possibilities 
have had a positive influence not seen in other industrial sectors, 
But the les son is there, insofar as the political will can improve 
tne condi~on~ for obtai~g technological resources. 
I 3) For this to happen, a basic factor has been the institutional 
_______ ·0 __ - •••• _. ____ • __ 
adjustment inside the administration in the ~Éarch for efficiE!ncy 
which, unfortunateIy, represents an exception in the Spanish 
administration in the seventies and most of the eighties. The 
positive role played by the DGAM might be an example to keep 
in mind in other public domains ."hen it co"mes to rationalizing 
the capital goods field here. 
. . / / .. 
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4) The trammg process has been very important for the technologi-
cal adaptation on the basis of imported technology. Once more, 
one structural elements seems to be fundamental - the availability 
of a domestic industrial base which.is able to make this assimila-
tion. This contrasts with the trends in other industrial sectors: 
which have based their modernization policy in technology almost 
entirely on the introduction of multinationals. 
5) The spin-off' effects to other sectors and companies has also 
been a result of the institutional way in which cooperation has 
been planned. Thus it is possible, in. sorne way and to sorne 
extent, to direct the effects of dev'elopment and the dissemination 
of technology. 
However, obviously, not all the consequences are positive, and 
• 
the followi.'lg should be inciuded in the less favorable balance: 
1) Despite the improvements referred to, there still remains plenty 
te be done in the area of planning, sufficiently in advance of 
government action. In fact, the delay against our industrial net-
work - not only in connection with defense - makes it neces.s.ary 
to have state plans for the purchase of e quipment somewhat 
in advance, in order to take the necessary steps and try to 
obtain maximum benefit for this industry. Otherwise ,the dis-
ad;vantage agains1: the large multinational firms is aggravated. 
2) The size of the industry associated with defense ln this country 
does not make it possible to thmk of it as a driving force gene-
rating notable effects for the economy as a whole. We are not 
l' . 
aci;¡gca8ng an lncrease in Spanish military industry, nor do we 
deny the existence of positive effects: all we wish to make 
clear is that the futura of our industr'.u3l. development cannot 
rely only on a military "push", so that we must bok for other 
sectorial ac'"..ion and possibilities. 
. . / / .. 
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3) While we may not deny that the form in which access has been 
had to sorne foreign technology has created positive effects, 
we may not ignore theproblems which hav~,ª, e,:x:;i,sted, such as 
the transfer of obsolete technology, making exports difficult, 
the participation in marginal partsof projects , etc. There is 
probably no miraculous formule, but the example of the AMX3Ó 
tank, and its lack of operability, should point down wrong paths 
- which should no to be followed again. 
4) While it is remembered that, in recent years, the attention given 
to R & D at the local leve! has improved, it is underúable that 
-;-' l' 
its potential is as yet sCarit'; merely in compar.i..son with our 
own industrial potential. In this sense, the defects pointed to 
in relation _ with the state of the research centres should be 
a matter for solution on a priority basis , in order to p=ovide 
. better access to technology fram overseas at the same time as .' 
constantly improving our own capabiliti.es.' 
I Of all the matters connected with R & D, probably tK~É most important 
( in the long term is the training of quaJ;f;ed personne!. 
There is a field of agreement which warns that the defense industry 
in this country has reached a certain cei1ing, not only in its capacity 
to meet domestic demand, but also in exports. The new situation 
of the modernization of the Army and of integration into NATO, 
as well as the need LÚ OVE:.:c.-come the Cr:1sjs once ar¡d for aU and 
to face up to the challenge of admission to the EEC - define a 
radically new panorama in which past experience must serve for 
more accurate decision-making. 
The basic problem is in the high politica! content of the subject 
of the military industrial sector. From a genuine perceived anti-
militarism (due in large part to the on-going majar social needs 
of the Spanish economy), ~o the need for stable relations between 
the mili.tary st..-ucture and civilian society, and including the novelty 
.. / / .. 
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of our dem=ratic experi.ence, all these are aspects which affect 
the decision-making function. 
. . / / .. 
N O T E S 
l.- On this matter, all availabel studies are agreed, including OECD 
work on technological efforts. Amongst others, the following may 
be consulted: PAYON & GOODMAN (1981), MOLERO (1983a) (1983b), 
OECD (1975) (1984), and BRAÑA, BUESA, MOLERO (1984). 
2.- See e.g. BUESA, BRAÑA (1979) and CASTELLS et. al (1986). 
3.- It is not possible to go into this matter further here but there 
is ample literature, including MUÑOZ, ROLDAN and SERRANO (1978), 
BRAÑA, BUESA and MOLERO (1984), BUESA arid MOLERO (1983) and 
BUESA (1982). 
4. - Of particular note are the successive OECn reports. See those re-
fa.-:red to in note 1. 
5.- This is obvious1y a generalization and we do admit that sorne compa-
ni.es have been able to pursue more consistent policies which, with 
time, has 1ed them to acquire a :::ertain know-how of their own 
which means that they can operate.on certain of the international 
markets. There is a text on the 1m, techno10gical assimilation from 
the employer I s association itself (CEOE 1980). 
6.- See BUESA (1982) and BRAÑA, BUESA, MOLERO (1984). 
7.- See Decree 418i1965 oi February 25th. See BUESA (1985) on the 
evolution of official technology imports policy. 
8.- See BERMEJO (1967) and UNCTAD (1974). 
9.- The basic legal provisions are Decree 2343(73 of September 21st, 
the Ministerial Order oi December 5th 1973, implementing that De=ee, 
and the Order of July 30th 1983 amending the earlier one. 
10.- A comparison of the standards can be found, for 1973 and 1981, 
in BUESA (1985), P. 5. 
2. 
11.- See Article 2 of Decree 2343/1973. 
12.- Included in BUESA (1983), Pp. 6 and 7. On the rate of import of 
foreign technology, see BRAÑA, BUESA, MOLERO (1984) Pp 296 and 
299. On the content of agreements following the 1983 Act, sE*! SANCHE;Z 
(1984) • 
13.- SANCHEZ (1981) has shown that foreign company subsidiarles have 
suffered increased costs for the acquisition of technology and BRAÑA, 
BUESA and MOLERO (1984) offer data on the Balance of Payments 
frem the large industrial companies wmch do not revea1 that reduction 
in the cost of the acqui.sition of foreign technology., 
14.- A synthesis of the matters referred to here is to be fOU11d in BARDA-
JI (1986) and in LOOSE-WEINTRAUB (1984). 
15.- These include substantial royalty payments, ,second and third genera-· 
tion technology and very rest...-:i.ctive clauses on export of the material 
produced. See CASTELLS et al (1986) and BARDAJI (1986). 
16.- See LOOSE-WEINTRAUB (1984), data taken from SIPRI. 
17.- See "Anuario El País" (1987), Madrid, P .119. 
18.- Data taken frem the doctoral thesis of Hermann Ranninger (1987). 
19.- Summary of data frem RANNINGER (1987). The main source of informa-
tion is the document on Las Grandes Compañías Industriales of the 
Ministry of Industry and E.nergy.M'lNER (1983). 
20.- To these companies we may add a large number which perform more 
traditional supplies to the Ministry of Defense, such as was pointed 
out at the beginning of this section. 
21.- See CASTELLS et al (1986), P. 781. 
22.- BARDAJI (1986). 
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